This paper addresses the tension between a knowledge-based view and a cognitive view of firms, asking the question of whether deep knowledge is always beneficial for technology ventures or whether the ability to be cognitively flexible may be more important for new venture development. We test this tension by examining the effects of expertise at the CEO and top management team on the likelihood of technology change among the population of U.S. solar photovoltaic manufacturing ventures between 1992 and 2007. Surprisingly we find that firms led by experts at both the CEO and management team level are actually more rigid, decreasing the likelihood of change. Furthermore, we find that firms led by non-experts (at the CEO and management team level) are in fact more flexible and likely to change technology. To explore these theories more we also conduct an interaction analysis in which we contrast the value of complementary knowledge, as suggested by the knowledge-based view, against the role of team structure, as suggested by a cognitive flexibility perspective. Interestingly we find that knowledge complementarity alone is insufficient to increase change. In contrast, cognitively flexible team structures can reverse the negative effects of expertise or amplify the positive benefits of cognitive flexibility. Finally, we argue that because technology ventures inhabit dynamic internal and external environments, change should be beneficial to performance and we find a positive relationship between change and performance.
INTRODUCTION
Technology opportunities represent some of the most rewarding economic opportunities and yet can be some of the most difficult to capture. Indeed technology development, both within the boundaries of the firm and in the broader market, can be fraught with surprises, obstacles, and change. As a result, firms often seek for resources, particularly knowledge-based resources, to help manage the uncertainty and provide an advantage in unknown and uncertain terrain. Consequently, often when a new venture, division, or effort is formed to capture a technology opportunity, key stakeholders, whether they be founders, managers, or investors intuitively search for domain experts that can help guide the new venture through turbulent waters.
From a theoretical perspective, such a reaction has some rationale. The knowledge-based view of the firm suggests that knowledge assets form the foundation of organization and competitive advantage for both established firm and for new ventures (Kogut and Zander 1992; Conner and Prahalad 1996; Grant 1996; Eisenhardt and Santos 2006 ). Yet a more cognitive view of organization suggests that while knowledge assets can be valuable, they can also be dangerous because they can create cognitive rigidities that result in knowledge and capability traps (Tripsas and Gavetti 2000; Gavetti 2005; Gilbert 2005; Eisenhardt, Furr et al. 2010 ). The potential dangers of cognitive rigidity linked to deep knowledge are particularly relevant for technology firms, especially new ventures, since they have a high need of both knowledge and flexibility (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995; Brown and Eisenhardt 1997) .
This paper addresses the tension between a knowledge-based view and a cognitive view of technology ventures, asking the question of whether deep knowledge is always beneficial for technology ventures or whether the ability to be cognitively flexible may be more important for new venture development. Specifically, while the knowledge-based view suggests that new ventures developing technology products benefit from having access to deep knowledge, when that knowledge is embedded in individuals as is often the case in many organizations, such expertise may also come with significant costs. Although experts may help advance development they may also become cognitively and emotionally attached to their knowledge and as a result decrease the ability of the organization to react and respond to potential changes (Dane 2010) . In contrast, emerging work on cognition suggests that the ability to be cognitively flexible-i.e. recognize, interpret, react to new information and change accordingly-may be crucial for organizational development, particularly new ventures in dynamic environments (Eisenhardt, Furr et al. 2010; Furr 2010) .
As a result, having organizational members who are non-expert in the focal area may be beneficial since these organization members may be equipped with a perspective that allows them to be more cognitively flexible.
We further contrast the knowledge-based view and cognitive flexibility perspective by examining the effect of the management team structure on adaptation and performance. Specifically a more knowledgebased view suggests that the risks of deep knowledge may be overcome by complementarity (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Wiersema and Bantel 1992; Boeker 1997; Carpenter, Geletkanycz et al. 2004) . In other words, the dangers of deep experts from inside the industry might be counteracted by creating team structures that have both outsiders and insiders. In contrast, while a cognitive outlook recognizes the relevance of knowledge complementarity, the cognitive flexibility perspective would suggest that the structure of the team might have greater effect because the structure would determine whether the team could be adequately flexible (Furr 2010; Garg and Furr 2010) . In other words, while a knowledge-based view would suggest that knowledge complementarity in general would be beneficial, the cognitive flexibility perspective would suggest that only certain structures will be adequately flexible to take advantage of complementarity.
To address these questions, we examine the tension between a knowledge-based and cognitive flexibility perspective among the population of U.S. solar photovoltaic market. The U.S. solar photovoltaic market represents a particularly interesting setting to address these questions because it has been dominated by technology ventures with the need for deep knowledge, struggling to develop new approaches in a technically diverse arena. At the same time, as an industry in an era of ferment, many firms have had to face both internal obstacles in developing extremely complex products while also dealing with significant external market change. Specifically, we examine the role of deep knowledge experts at the CEO and top management team (TMT) level on the likelihood of three degrees (major, moderate and minor) of technology change as well as the link between those changes and performance outcomes. Although the role of expertise embedded in the management team is an important question for new ventures, rarely has the literature addressed the impact of deep human capital background on firm change (Beckman 2006) , focusing instead on issues such as demographic distribution (e.g. tenure, functional, or educational heterogeneity) or as explicit knowledge resources (e.g. patents).
Given the potential relevance of deep knowledge in the context of solar cell development, we find, surprisingly, that deep knowledge at either the CEO or top management team level can be dangerous for new ventures, restricting their ability to be adaptive, which eventually decreases the venture performance. In contrast, we find that new ventures led by non-experts, or individuals from outside the solar industry, at either the CEO or top management team level are much more cognitively flexible and adaptive. Furthermore, we find that the ability to be adaptive is correlated with increased performance. Therefore, on the surface, the surprising interpretation is that the capacity to be cognitively flexible may be more important for technology ventures in dynamic environments than deep knowledge. Indeed, having deep experts on the management team, despite being theoretically and intuitively appealing, may be dangerous for new ventures, causing them to stay the course when they should adapt.
To test this observation further we also explored the role of knowledge complementarity, as suggested by the knowledge-based view, and contrasted it with the possibility that management structures influences cognitive flexibility. Surprisingly we found that having a cognitively flexible team structure (nonexpert CEO/ expert team) could actually reverse the negative effects of having a top management team composed of deep experts. However, we found that the inverse was not true. An expert CEO leading a management team of non-experts actually increased the rigidity of the team rather than making it more flexible! Therefore, while knowledge was valuable to new ventures, what had the most positive effect on new ventures was not simply a matter of knowledge complementarity but of complementarity enabled by cognitive flexibility. A cross-level interaction therefore occurred between the structure of the team and the characteristics of the CEO. At a practical level, these results emphasized specific team structures, specifically that a non-expert leading a team of experts can combine both the ability to adapt and deep knowledge. At a theoretical level, these results provide interesting insights into the role of knowledge in new ventures but more importantly highlight the relevance of cognitive flexibility. Indeed, while knowledge may be important, cognitive flexibility, an often overlooked trait in the literature, may be much more important for new venture success.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES The Knowledge-Based View
The knowledge-based view, emerging from both the areas of learning theory (Huber 1991; Argote 2004 ) and from the resources-based view (Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991) , emphasizes the central importance of knowledge to organizations and performance (Kogut and Zander 1992; Grant 1996; Eisenhardt and Santos 2006) . According to this perspective, organizations possessing knowledge, particularly tacit or deeply embedded knowledge (Polanyi 1966) , are more likely to generate significant competitive advantage and sustained performance in any number of activities, from capability development (Zollo and Winter 2002; Zollo and Singh 2004) , to product development (Hargadon and Sutton 1997; Hansen 1999) , to alliances and acquisitions (Mowery, Oxley et al. 1996; Haleblian and Finkelstein 1999) . Furthermore, the more dynamic the environment, the more important knowledge resources to strategic renewal and dynamic capability (Grant 1996; Eisenhardt and Santos 2006) .
Although the knowledge-based view has often been mainly studied in the context of established firms (Decarolis and Deeds 1999; Gupta and Govindarajan 2001) , the knowledge perspective also has significant application for new ventures. Indeed new ventures by definition are characterized by limited knowledge and one of the fundamental struggles of entrepreneurs is to gather information about technology, markets, products, customers, competitors and a multitude of uncertainties (Bhide 2003) . However, given their nascent state new ventures often struggle to access knowledge resources and so those with access to significant knowledge assets may have performance advantage (Wiklund and Shepherd 2003 While there are many sources of knowledge for new ventures, including patents, alliances, and advisors, perhaps one of the most common and valuable comes from the individuals within the venture.
Indeed, not only are individuals a particularly valuable source of knowledge but they may often be the only way of acquiring particularly valuable, tacit knowledge. Furthermore, given the thirst for knowledge in new ventures, being able to access individuals with deep knowledge about technologies, market, customers, distribution, etc., can be the difference between success and failure during the rocky road of new venture development. Empirical research not only highlights the benefits of possessing knowledge, but frequently emphasizes individuals as the locus of such valuable knowledge (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon et al. 1994; Song, Podoynitsyna et al. 2008) .
Given the advantages espoused by the knowledge-based view and the demands for knowledge in new ventures, it is not surprising that the individuals with deep knowledge in the focal industry-a.k.a. the experts-are theoretically and intuitively expected to benefit new ventures (see Dane 2010 for a review).
Experts have been defined in the psychological and management literature as having a high level of domain knowledge (Chi, Glaser et al. 1988; Ericsson and Charness 1994; Benner and Tushman 2003; Dane 2010) .
Such knowledge can be valuable for new ventures and a number of studies from both the strategic management and organizational behavior perspectives emphasize the importance of experts for various aspects of organizational life: decision making, group performance, knowledge processing, and other activities, including new venture development (Fiedler 1986; Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 1988; Chi, Glaser et al. 1988; Christensen, Suarez et al. 1998; Kahneman and Klein 2009) . The literature on experts suggests that they not only possess more knowledge but have a more robust, structural understanding of the relationships inside the knowledge structure (Dane 2010) . As a result, while novices are often only able to perceive the surface features of a problem, experts are able to understand its underlying structure (Chi, Glaser et al. 1988; Hinds, Patterson et al. 2001 ). This capacity may allow experts to bring both critical knowledge and a deeper understanding of how to apply that knowledge to many settings, including new ventures. Therefore, it is not surprising that when founding or investing in new ventures, one of the central concerns is often how to access domain experts to guide the nascent venture. Indeed, anecdotal observations of new ventures seem to suggest that key stakeholders often seek access to experts by adding them to the top management team.
For a firm in a technology setting, one of the most valuable forms of expertise may be the knowledge relevant to the focal industry. One of the challenges for any firm entering a new market is developing the capabilities, knowledge, and processes to produce, distribute, and sell products in an unfamiliar domain (Bryce, Dyer et al. 2010) . For new ventures in a technology industry, the need for domain expertise may be even more significant, since new firms must both develop a complex, technology product while also understand how to operate within the market dynamics of a particular industry (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon et al. 1994; Song, Podoynitsyna et al. 2008) . Therefore, new ventures that are able to access individuals with expertise in the technology or market dynamics (marketing, distribution, sales, and so forth) of a particular industry may be more likely to be successful along multiple dimensions. One significant reason may be that individuals with deep expertise from within the industry may understand how to speed the development of new products and commercialize those products quickly.
However, another critical capacity for many new ventures is the ability to adapt. Because new ventures begin with limited knowledge and resources, the probability of entering the market in the optimal position with an optimal product or service is low. In fact, in his study of new venture founding, Bhide(2003) observed that new ventures by nature had imperfect information at founding and therefore the vast majority had to adapt in some way in order to be successful. For firms developing technology, the need to adapt may be compounded by both firm and industry level factors. At the industry level, if the technology being developed is in the early phases of the technology life cycle, or in an era of ferment, there may be many changes to which new ventures must adapt (Tushman and Anderson 1986; Christensen, Suarez et al. 1998 ).
Indeed, ample empirical and anecdotal evidence supports the view that many new and established firms must adapt to industry level changes in order to succeed (Garud and Van De Ven 1992; Garud and Nayyar 1994; Christensen and Bower 1996; Gilbert 2005; Tripsas 2009) . At the firm level, technical development can also be fraught with technical risk composed of challenges, obstacles, and surprises that can stall or stop development in harmful ways. To be successful, firms must often find techniques to overcome obstacles, alter course, and adapt. Indeed firms that are able to adapt quickly to such challenges appear to be more successful in the long term, gathering resources, reaching the market more quickly, and more effectively capturing new opportunities (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995; Brown and Eisenhardt 1997; Eisenhardt, Furr et al. 2010; Furr 2010) .
Given the potential need to be adaptive, another significant contribution of individuals with deep expertise may be the capacity to adjust more quickly to industry or firm-level developments that require adaptation. Specifically, if the firm encounters challenges in internal development, individuals with deep expertise within the focal industry may be able to more quickly recognize alternate solutions and adapt appropriately. In addition, individuals with deep expertise within the focal industry may have a better understanding of technical and competitive dynamics, enabling them to understand emerging trends or challenges and adapt more quickly to these challenges when they appear. Therefore, from a knowledge-based perspective, we expect that firms with access to unique knowledge resources, particularly domain experts, will be more adaptive and more successful than those without such resources. 
The Dangers of Deep Knowledge
Despite the many advantages of deep knowledge suggested by the knowledge-based view, an alternate perspective rooted in cognition suggests that deep knowledge, whether at the firm or the individual level, can also have drawbacks. Deep knowledge can also create cognitive rigidity, commitment, and entrenchment that lead to capability traps, myopia, and blindness that make it challenging for organizations of all kinds to adapt. These dangers can occur at both the firm, team, and individual level.
At the level of the firm, a significant body of research highlights how deep knowledge in a focal area can create rigidities that inhibits the ability to adapt. Specifically, deep knowledge can lead firms to develop perspectives and processes that make it difficult to recognize the value of new information or innovations because such changes do not fit or make sense within the existing paradigm. For example, Henderson and Clark (1990) observed that semiconductor equipment manufacturers deeply embedded in their current generation of technology had great difficulties recognizing and responding to the next generation of technology because their information filters, channels, and strategies led them to disregard the signals heralding change. Similarly, Tripsas(1997) in a study of typesetters observed that when a new generation of typesetting equipment emerged, not only did firms with deep knowledge have difficulty recognizing the need to change, their efforts at change were often constrained within the frame of the prior generation. So for example, one typesetter attempted to develop a photo-typesetting machine based on the old hot-metal technology, which resulted in an awkward and complex machine that fit neither generation. Likewise, Gilbert (2005) in a study of newspapers, Christensen and Bower (1996) in a study of disk drives, Tripsas and Gavetti(2000) in a study of Polaroid, and others, have examined a similar pattern where deep knowledge creates cognitive and process rigidities that make it difficult for firms to respond to significant external and internal requirement to change (Sull, Tedlow et al. 1997; Rosenbloom 2000) . Similarly, even for less monumental changes, deep knowledge can create firm rigidities and capability traps that make it difficult to change. For example, Leonard-Barton (1992) observed firm product development activities and noted that knowledge capabilities often created mental frames that were hard for firms to escape. Instead of being able to design a new product freely according the needs of the perceived market, product development efforts were often constrained within the existing frame. As another example, Garud and Van de Ven (1992) studied a venture attempting to develop cochlear implants and found that once the team had set the frame around a certain technology, they found it almost impossible to adjust their perspective and instead tried to convince others (unsuccessfully) that their approach was correct. In short a growing body of literature emphasizes the observation that deep knowledge can create cognitive and process rigidities for firms that make it hard to adapt.
The same cognitive dangers also appear to be relevant for teams and individuals within firms, particularly experts with deep domain knowledge or experts. Consistent with prior definitions in the psychology and organizational behavior literature, experts are defined as individuals with deep domain expertise acquired through experience (Chi, Glaser et al. 1988; Ericsson and Charness 1994; Benner and Tushman 2003; Dane 2010) .While experts may have valuable knowledge, recent theory and research suggests that experts may be more susceptible to developing cognitive rigidity that makes it difficult for them to cognitively adapt. Specifically, the very characteristics of domain experts-the breadth and depth of their cognitive schema-can make those schemas more resistant to change. Indeed individuals with deep domain expertise often become mentally and emotionally committed to their perspective, making it difficult for them to see the value of new perspectives (Frensch and Sternberg 1989; Fiske and Taylor 1991; Frensch and Funke 1995; Dane 2010) or applying familiar knowledge in new settings where it is no longer appropriate (Holyoak 1991; Hinds, Patterson et al. 2001; Hass and Hansen 2005) . Even more relevant, existing research has demonstrated that experts often have a very difficult time recognizing conditions of change. For example, studies have shown that an expert's industry schema is often incredibly stable and resistant to change (Frensch and Sternberg 1989; Hodgkinson 1997) . In one study, expert accountants were less able to deal with a new accounting rule than novice accountants precisely because the depth and breadth of their schema made it difficult for them to adapt (Marchant, Robinson et al. 1991) . Certainly the observation that experts have a hard time recognizing and adjusting to change has been suggested by multiple studies across multiple industries (Huff, Huff et al. 1992; Sull, Tedlow et al. 1997; Huff and Huff 2000; Thomke and Kuemmerle 2002) . Indeed, it was precisely William Shockley's deep emotional and cognitive commitment to his own expertise that led to the downfall of Shockley Semiconductor and the rise of the Fairchild spinoff which in turn gave birth to the entire semiconductor industry (Holbrook, Cohen et al. 2000) .
To this end, Dane (2010) provides an extensive review of the literature on cognition and expertise in which he synthesizes a theory of cognitive entrenchment whereby experts with deep domain knowledge become less flexible and adaptive over time. Dane demonstrates, based on extensive literature in the field of psychology and cognition, that greater domain experience reinforces an expert's cognitive schema, leading to entrenchment. This entrenchment leads to problem fixation, inability to adapt, and decreased ability to recombine novel concepts. As a result, according to a theory of cognitive entrenchment, domain experts are more likely to remain committed to their focal ideas, resisting adaptation, and responding with incremental adaptations which may limit or even harm the ability of an organization such as a new venture to successfully overcome the many surprises, obstacles, and challenges of development. Such dangers would seem to contradict the benefits espoused by a knowledge-based perspective.
Cognitive Flexibility and New Venture Development
In response to the cognitive rigidity or entrenchment view, an emerging organizational perspective suggests the central role of cognitive flexibility in the ability of organizations to adapt to internal and external demands for change (Eisenhardt, Furr et al. 2010; Furr 2010; Garg and Furr 2010) . In contrast to cognitive rigidity, cognitive flexibility represents the ability of organizational members to recognize, interpret, and integrate new information and alter their perspective accordingly (Furr 2010 ).The cognitive flexibility perspective emerges from early work on organizations responding to technical change suggesting that cognition can have a significant effect on the recognition of change and opportunity (Ocasio 1997; Gavetti and Levinthal 2000; Smith and Tushman 2005; Gavetti 2009 ). While much early work emphasized cognitive rigidity, recent empirical work has begun to suggest the role of cognitive factors including managerial perspectives, attention, and framing in the ability of organizational members to recognize and respond to change (Gilbert 2006; Kaplan 2008; Shalley and Perry-Smith 2008; Eggers and Kaplan 2009; Santos and Eisenhardt 2009; Eisenhardt, Furr et al. 2010; Garg and Furr 2010) . In support of this view Eisenhardt et al. (2010) also argued for the importance of cognitive flexibility, emphasizing the role variety, novelty, and abstraction to the ability of managers to respond to dynamic environments and recent work has begun to explore the role and impact of cognitive flexibility on organizations (Furr 2010; Garg and Furr 2010) .
Interestingly, the cognitive flexibility perspective offers an alternate view of knowledge in new ventures that may be relevant for their successful development. In particular, this work suggests that while knowledge clearly has its value, in contexts where change occurs, the ability of organization members to recognize and cognitively adjust to such change may be more critical than the knowledge itself. Indeed because many new ventures face high uncertainty with limited knowledge, the ability to be cognitively flexible may be more critical to new venture development and success than possessing deep knowledge, particularly in dynamic environments where change can occur externally and internally.
Specifically, regarding deep knowledge and expertise, the cognitive flexibility perspective suggests that individuals from outside the domain area (which we will label non-experts) are more likely to be cognitively flexible than individuals with deep domain expertise. Such non-experts differ somewhat from novices, who have little or no experience in any domain. Non-experts simply bring experience from outside the focal domain and therefore are neither novices nor domain experts. There are several reasons why such "non-experts" or outsiders might be more valuable to the establishment of cognitive flexibility and to the success of a new venture than individuals who are experts.
First, individuals who bring external experience, particularly broad experience, may have less entrenched, stable schema which allows greater cognitive flexibility. Indeed, in his work on cognitive entrenchment, Dane (2010) argued that the more time an individual spends in in a domain, the more stable and resistant to change their cognitive schemas become. The counter-point to this pattern is that when individuals come from outside a focal domain or have been exposed to multiple domains, their schemas may be less rigid, enabling them to be more cognitively flexible. Indeed, the very fact that an individual's schema does not match the arena of current activity, can allow that individual to see the focal problem or industry in ways that experts inside the domain overlook. For example, Barr et al. (1992) observed that when threatened by rising highway traffic, Rock Island Railroad failed because the CEO and management team, who were deep experts in the industry, failed to recognize the need to change. In contrast, CN&W brought in someone from outside the industry-a lawyer-who found it much easier to question the established way of business, see the problems the railroad faced in a new light, and adapt. Similarly, other empirical works similarly suggest that the non-experts, or outsiders, in an industry, are often able to adjust their cognitive perspective more flexibility than those with deep expertise (Sull, Tedlow et al. 1997; Holbrook, Cohen et al. 2000; Gilbert 2006 ).
Second, in addition to having less rigid schemas, when individuals are exposed to multiple domains, they actually develop schema that are more abstract and flexible. Research on learning has demonstrated that when individuals are exposed to multiple domains, they learn to abstract their knowledge, which makes it more flexible and transferable (Bingham and Eisenhardt 2011) . For example, studies have shown that students exposed to multiple mathematics domains or different types of games actually perform better in the focal domain than those exposed only to the focal domain (Ellis 1965; Schilling, Vidal et al. 2003) . Similarly, research on new ventures entering new international markets demonstrated that the more successful ventures developed abstract, transferable knowledge in the form of simple rules that allowed them to flexibly adjust to new settings (Bingham, Eisenhardt et al. 2007 ). Therefore, another benefit of having experience outside a focal domain, is that the broader that experience, the more likely an individual is to develop abstract, transferable knowledge that increases cognitive flexibility (Eisenhardt, Furr et al. 2010 ).
Third, simply possessing different schemas may also increase the available analogies and templates, thereby increasing the chances of recognizing new paths to change or a novel recombination. Research has suggested that analogical reasoning and analogies play an important role in the ability of managers to adapt to novel situations because analogies can provide templates for understanding and acting (Gavetti, Levinthal et al. 2005; Furr 2010 ). Because outsiders have a different set of experiences from other industries, such nonexperts may bring analogies that can increase adaptation in new settings. For example, as part of this research a qualitative interview portion was conducted with new ventures and these support the view that novel analogies were important in their ability to adapt. For example, one firm in the sample was able to make a leap forward by applying technology from the food industry-specifically potato chip dryers-to the making of solar cells. Another firm in the sample making a significant change observed that, "It was precisely because [the new VP] came out of life sciences that he had the insight that we could make our [product] more modular.
[He] took one look at it and said why are we doing it like this? That one observation led us to change our entire architecture and the manufacturing process and probably saved us a year or more." Not only do non-experts coming from the outside bring new analogies, but the chances for novel recombination and greater creativity are also greater (Hargadon and Sutton 1997; Dane 2010) , increasing the likelihood of cognitive flexibility and change.
Finally, while schemas may be a significant reason for the difference in cognitive flexibility between experts and non-experts, the conscious and affective commitment to one's schema may be an equally important reason why non-experts are more cognitively flexible. Indeed, affect plays an important role in the ability of individuals and teams to learn, and individuals can become emotionally committed to their own perspective, decreasing their ability to be cognitively flexible (Barr, Stimpert et al. 1992; Sull, Tedlow et al. 1997; Holbrook, Cohen et al. 2000) . However, even more importantly, the simple recognition that one is outside one's "expertise" may be a powerful enabler of cognitive flexibility. Indeed, the "transfer effect" in the psychological literature suggests the dangers of inappropriate generalization of lessons from one setting to another setting that appears similar but is in fact different (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Plous 1993) . As an example of this effect, in their study of corporate acquisitions, Finkelstein and Haleblian (2002) argued that often management teams that believed they understood the acquisition situation, inappropriately transferred learning which decreased acquisition performance. In contrast, teams that recognized the differences had higher performing acquisitions. To this end, interviews with executives for this study highlighted the importance of their ability to recognize they might not have the answer: as one CEO from the pilot study stated, the key to his ability to recognize the need to change was that "I knew that I didn't know the right answer."
For these reasons, firms with access to non-experts who come from outside the focal domain will likely have increased cognitive flexibility as well as likelihood of recognizing the need or opportunity to change. In particular, because the CEO and top management team occupy a decision making position, their influence will likely be significant on the cognitive flexibility of the overall organization (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996) . Furthermore, since new ventures are relatively small in comparison to large firms, the cognitive flexibility of the CEO and top management team should play a significant role in the ability of the venture to adapt and change technology.
Hypothesis 1b: Firms led by a CEO without domain expertise (non-expert outsiders) are more likely to adapt than firms where a CEO has domain expertise. Hypothesis 2b: Firms led by a top management team without domain expertise (non-expert outsiders) are more likely to adapt than firms where a top management team has domain expertise.
Notice that the hypotheses H1a and H1b are opposites, reflecting the tension between the knowledge-based and cognitive flexibility perspectives. Hypotheses H2a and H2b are similarly opposite.
Knowledge Complementarity or Cognitive Flexibility?
Despite the suggested benefits of cognitive flexibility, knowledge still has significant value for organizations, particularly technology ventures. Is it possible that new ventures can succeed without access to deep knowledge in the top management team? Or can new ventures assemble complementary knowledge and reap the benefits of both knowledge and flexibility? A more knowledge-based perspective suggests that knowledge can be recombined in useful ways that might enable a firm to change (Kogut and Zander 1992; Conner and Prahalad 1996) . Similarly, extant research implies that knowledge of different types or domains can often be recombined, filling gaps in missing resources, and providing greater performance to an organization (Helfat 1997; Galunic and Eisenhardt 2001; McEvily and Chakravarthy 2002; Katila 2004 ).
Perhaps nowhere is this better illustrated than the top management team literature where one of the major findings is that team diversity can provide performance benefits (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Carpenter, Geletkanycz et al. 2004; Hambrick 2007) as well as influence the ability of large organizations to change (Wiersema and Bantel 1992; Wiersema and Bantel 1993; Boeker 1997; Boeker and Wiltbank 2005) . Therefore, a more purely knowledge-based perspective would suggest that complementarity in knowledge resources, for example combining experts and non-experts would enable a firm to leverage the value of knowledge while remaining flexible.
Hypothesis 3a: Firms with complementarity knowledge in the management team (expert and non-expert knowledge combinations between the CEO and management team levels) are more likely to adapt than firms with such expertise.
In contrast to this view, while a cognitive perspective recognizes the value of knowledge, a cognitive flexibility perspective suggests that certain team structures might be more or less flexible and thereby enable or inhibit the value of any complementary knowledge. As illustration, studies of cognitive rigidity have frequently found that top managers, particularly CEOs, can restrict organizational perspective and adaptation.
For example, in his study of newspapers responding to the emergence of online media portals, Gilbert (2006) found that the CEOs of many newspapers created significant cognitive rigidities. However, one division of a major newspaper led by a non-expert (outsider to the traditional newspaper business) was able to develop innovative new businesses but only because the newspaper was staffed by a CEO capable of managing the strategic and cognitive paradoxes of competing businesses. Indeed, CEOs with the cognitive capacity for challenges such as managing paradox may be a particularly important structural element for firm cognitive flexibility (Smith and Tushman 2005) . Therefore the structure of the team, or the relationship of a CEO to the rest of the management team, may play a fundamental role in the ability to be cognitively flexible. Given existing theory about the role of the CEO, one prediction would be that a firm composed of a non-expert at the top, leading a management team of experts may be a structure that allows greater cognitive flexibility than an expert CEO leading a team of non-experts.
------Insert Figure 1 Here------This prediction differs from a knowledge complementarity view, which would predict that either arrangement should allow greater cognitive flexibility.
Hypothesis 3b: Firms with a cognitively flexible management structure (non-expert CEO / expert management team) are more likely to adapt than firms with an alternate structure (expert CEO / non-expert management team)

Change and Performance
Finally, although cognitive flexibility may influence the ability to change, an important question is whether such change increases or decreases firm performance. Clearly, in some circumstances change can be beneficial whereas in others it can be harmful. However, when firms face dynamic internal or external environments, the ability to change will likely be beneficial to performance. Dynamic internal environments consist of situations where organizations face high technical or market risk in the sense that the correct solution may be unknown or complex. For example, organizations developing complex technology-based products face significant risk of the device not working, taking longer to develop, or encountering unforeseen obstacles. Although firm members can attempt to persist through these obstacles, it may be more beneficial to change course and pursue a new direction. Therefore, under conditions of internal uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity characteristic of dynamism (Davis, Eisenhardt et al. 2009) , cognitive flexibility and change should be correlated with performance. Similarly, when firms face dynamic external environments, such as a rapid pace of technical or competitive change, the ability to adapt quickly may be vital for future performance. For example, during an era of ferment when many technologies are competing, technology standards and advancements can change rapidly, shifting the basis of competitive advantage (Anderson and Tushman 1990; Christensen, Suarez et al. 1998) . To remain competitive, firms must often adjust to unexpected or emerging developments in the external environment. Illustrative of this challenge, in the solar industry context of this study, multiple technical paradigms have been in competition for several years leading to significant and rapid technical change. Indeed, in the words of one prominent solar firm CEO, "the solar industry has changed so much it's almost enough to make you want to cry" (Woody 2010) . Therefore, when firms face external market dynamism, change should also be correlated with performance. Recent evidence seems to suggest that many firms face such challenges (Wiggins and Ruefli 2005) , particularly technologybased firms that face both rapidly developing internal and external markets exacerbating the need for change to sustain performance (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995; Brown and Eisenhardt 1997) .
Hypothesis 4: When firms face dynamic internal and external environments, change (technology change) is correlated with higher performance
Data and Methods
The setting of the study is the population of photovoltaic (PV) manufacturing ventures founded in the United States between 1992 and 2007. The solar industry is an ideal setting for the study because the unique history of the solar industry allows observation from the rebirth of the industry to the end of the study period. The solar industry initially began developing in the 1960s, experiencing a burst of activity with the energy crisis of the 1970s. However, after this first energy crisis resolved, solar PV was still a very expensive solution for power production: at the end of the first energy crisis, PV modules, without installation costs included, were nearly twenty times the comparable cost of coal-generated power. As a result, when government withdrew its support, the industry collapsed, leading to what many considered the death of the industry (beyond a handful of niche producers). However, in 1992, a climate change treaty that eventually became the Kyoto treaty was signed. The member nations committed to curb global emissions, which led to the establishment of subsidies, particularly by Japan and Germany, creating a resurgent market for PV. Also in 1992, the U.S. voted an Energy Policy Act that reinstated the renewal of PV subsidies in the U.S., which also helped spur industry rebirth. Currently, the solar industry is a dynamic market with ten parallel technology categories being developed concurrently in the U.S., all characterized by rapid and continuous innovation reshaping each trajectory.
As a result, there are many opportunities and demands for change in the PV industry. The founders of ventures in this industry come from many backgrounds (including internet commerce, hard drive manufacturing, electronics, glass, solar science, etc.), which increases the potential opportunity to observe change since ventures must adapt their initial resources to the new market (see figure 2 for a summary of solar ventures founders backgrounds). Also, there is a large quantity of data available on the industry from government and public sources, which allows robust data collection and validation. Finally, because of their small size ventures are more transparent allowing increased accuracy of observation (Bingham, Eisenhardt et al. 2007 ). Furthermore, the effects of cognition at the management team on technology change can be easily combine data from PV News, the only industry data source covering the entire history of the PV industry, DOE and NREL technology reports, all federal and state grant documents, archival company data, industry association databases and secondary reporting by longitudinal industry journals. In all cases, events of technology change were corroborated by multiple data sources which allowed robust verification of events of technology change. In cases where data for independent variables was missing, email communication and phone interviews with firm executives were conducted to confirm or complete existing data (<10%). The longitudinal data set is measured in quarterly time intervals because of the fast-moving, rapid development and the recent, rich data sources available. In addition, we conducted qualitative case interviews with twelve organizations to validate the research question and provide insight on the role of cognitive flexibility in change. Case interviews followed the standards of qualitative research including court-room questioning, multiple respondents when possible, and efforts to control for retrospective bias including multiple interviews over time Yin 1994) .
Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variable is the event of a technology change. Although there are several definitions of technology change in the literature, including definitions based on product architecture (Henderson and Clark 1990) , relationship to existing innovation (Christensen and Bower 1996) , and relationship to existing capabilities (Abernathy and Clark 1985) , each definition acknowledges differing degrees of technology change. However, rarely has the literature addressed the different degrees of technology change. Therefore, in this paper, the primary dependent variable is divided into three degrees of change-major, moderate, and minor-corresponding with Henderson and Clark's (1990) Major technology change is defined as a change between technology categories. The industry categories include silicon wafers (polysilicon and monosilicon), cadmium, amorphous, CIGS, organic, dye-sensitized cells, nano-materials, multi-junction cells and concentrators (low and high concentrators treated as distinct categories). These industry technology categories are widely accepted and are based on differences in chemistry (i.e. change between elements used in the solar cell) and scale (i.e. change between high and low concentrators). For example, a firm moving from developing an organic (plastic-based) solar cell using titanium oxides to a CIGS thin-film solar cell which uses copper, indium, gallium and diselenide would be making a change between industry categories (change between chemistries). This scale of change is categorized as a "major" change because it represents a momentous change in technology. Because categories of cell technologies are very different, often fundamentally new knowledge must be developed regarding very different cell chemistries or engineering, which requires the replacement or retooling of scientific and engineering staff. Furthermore, changing categories of technologies requires the venture to address new price points, new competitors, and even a new identity as the manufacturer of a separate technology. In the words of one entrepreneur in the study, such a change "is huge, massive."
A moderate technology change is defined as a significant change within industry technology categories.
Specifically, these changes involve changes within chemistry or scale but still represent a significant reformulation of the technology. For example, a firm pursuing a high-concentration solar module which shifts from an architecture that concentrates light at 3x to one that concentrates light at 1000x normal sunlight strength is making a significant change in product architecture but not a change between categories.
Such changes require significant engineering or chemistry reformulations and often the final solar cell has a visibly different form, but because these changes are within category, they represent a less significant shift than a change between categories.
Finally, a minor technology change is defined as a minor modification to format or application of the technology. In these types of resource changes, the firm makes only minor modifications to its product architecture. An example of this case would include changing size of the solar cell, adding barrier films or making slight modifications to the technology to apply it in a related setting. Although this type of change does require the firm to make modest alterations, including how they manufacture, assemble and integrate the solar cell, it is only a minor change in the format of the cell architecture and can be accomplished comparatively more easily. These scales of change are confirmed both in industry literature and by the panel of experts surveyed.
Events of change are measured as a binary variable that equals one if a firm changes its technology in a quarter and zero if it does not. Technology change is defined as any change to the firm's technology portfolio and are significant events for the firm given their limited resources and the difficulty that firms have in adding or abandoning technology (Sull, Tedlow et al. 1997; Holbrook, Cohen et al. 2000; Rosenbloom 2000) . Events of technology change are recorded when an unambiguous change in technology occur and each instance of change is verified by two or more reports of a change occurrence. In many cases, the timing of technology change was consistent across reports but in cases where there were differences in the reported date of a change the earliest event date reported was used.
For the performance analysis, the dependent variable is the log of financial resources obtained by the venture. Measuring performance in ventures is a challenge, but prior literature has established that the amount of financial resources a venture is able to obtain is an appropriate measure of performance (Burton, Sorensen et al. 2002; Higgins and Gulati 2003; Beckman, Burton et al. 2007 ). The amount of financial resources obtained is a particularly appropriate dependent variable for the solar industry because solar manufacturing is capital intensive (costs of a standard 100 megawatt factory range from $30M-$100M). As a result, firms must raise significant capital from resource providers, such as venture capitalists, grant agencies, and partners who typically have an intimate view of the firm's performance and make resource allocation decisions based on those observations, providing a strong indicator of performance. Private and public funding amounts were recorded as reported in VentureXpert, federal and state funding documentation (NREL, DOE, and USAspending.gov), and reports by ventures reporting funding. The producer price index (PPI) was used to adjust funding amounts for inflation and logged the dependent variable to mitigate skewness.
Independent Variables
Data for the measures were gathered using a method established by Beckman, Burton et al. (2007) based on assembling career histories for each top management team member. Career histories were extracted from biographies provided by entrepreneurial organizations and enhanced with data from LinkedIn, Zoominfo, biographical searches and in cases of missing data, phone calls or emails requesting resumes.
Given that entrepreneurial organizations often attempted to create legitimacy using the biographies of their management teams, and that resources such as LinkedIn and Zoominfo are very rich, fewer than 10% of biographical histories required verification via email or phone calls. Consistent with prior work, data on the top management team was captured for the CEO and the CEO's direct reports. However, because this study attempts to investigate the effects of the CEO and TMT separately, the measure of TMT in the study excludes the CEO to avoid confounding the effect of the CEO and the rest of the team. However, as a robustness check, each statistical analysis was conducted with a measure of the CEO and direct reports together and the results confirmed the analyses reported here. Alternate measures were tested for robustness and these measures replicated the results.
In addition to the independent variables, we include a binary variable control for product technology generation because each product generation (1 st , 2 nd or 3 rd generation) has different levels of material and process knowledge which affects the ease of technology change. We include a measure of team size, average team experience, and team heterogeneity (Blau's measure of functional heterogeneity (Blau 1977) ), calculated quarterly, because of their relevance to the focal question (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990; Carpenter, Geletkanycz et al. 2004) . We employ these same controls across both the CEO and TMT models to enable comparison but for the sake of robustness when testing the CEO variables, we tested models that include CEO career experience and tenure in the CEO position at the focal firm. Hypothesized results remained the same.
In addition we tested many other potential control variables including controls for team tenure and tenure heterogeneity, firm size, product technology category, time controls (both annual and periodic), funding amount and information availability but these controls were not statistically significant and did not 1 Note, operations and engineering were grouped with business because in the PV industry these positions are typically either focused on commercial manufacturing or are more business than research-oriented. materially alter the analysis. One reason team tenure was insignificant may be the relative youth of most firms.
One reason firm size was inconsequential to the analysis may be that the firms in the sample were all of similar size and comparatively young. Since these variables were either insignificant or did not change the analysis they were dropped from the final models for the sake of parsimony and efficiency. Controls for potential time periods of increased opportunity to change or for the availability of resources to change, potentially related to a the growing interest in solar over the time period, also proved inconsequential, which is due in part to the statistical analysis technique (a semi-parametric Cox model) which controls for timevarying factors that affect all firm equally (Gimeno, Hoskisson et al. 2005) .
Statistical Analysis
For an analysis of time to change, an event history analysis most efficiently captures the full effects of the longitudinal data on a dichotomous change while controlling for time-dependence and the effective estimation of time-varying covariates (Haveman 1993; Singer and Willett 2003; Barnett and McKendrick 2004; Dobrev and Barnett 2005; Blossfeld, Golsch et al. 2007; Haveman, Rao et al. 2007 ). The analysis employed a multi-event history analysis based on a Cox semi-parametric model (Cox, 1972; Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980) which controls for time dependence but makes no assumptions about the underlying hazard distribution. Multiple robustness checks were conducted, including alternate models such as discrete conditional Cox logit as well as a log-logistic models, and they strongly validated the results in the primary model.
Because, in this study, change can occur more than once to each subject, a multi-event methodology is required to take advantage of the full longitudinal character of the data (Thomas, Eden et al. 2007 ). An advantage of the Cox-model is that multi-event methods have become increasingly well-established in multiple fields (Box-Steffensmeier 2004) as have corrections for the violation of the independence assumption which occurs when multiple observations are made of a single subject. Although frailty or simple stratification models have been employed as a correction, the predominant method of correction is the use of a variance-covariance matrix adjustment to the maximum partial likelihood estimate to generate robust estimators (Lin and Wei, 1989) . This study applies the variance correction methodology as opposed to frailty methods that have been criticized for imposing a specific distribution on the random effects term, which must also be independent of the model's covariates (Blossfeld and Rohwer, 1995) and because variancecorrection methods allow greater flexibility in the treatment of events and time. Nonetheless, as a validity check, frailty method corrections were performed and largely confirmed the results of the variance-adjusted methods.
In applying multi-event methods, the independence of change events and event clock must be properly addressed. The base model assumes that each change event is independent and applies the Andersen-Gill variance-correction model (Andersen and Gill, 1982) However, as a control for cases where events may be non-independent, we tested conditional risk variancecorrections which stratifies change events into groups and thereby controls for the order of change events, while constraining parameters to a single estimate (Prentice, Williams, and Peterson, 1981) . In addition to the tests of hypotheses 1 and 2, an interaction analysis is conducted for hypothesis 3 by interacting the CEO and TMT measures to identify any additional effect of team structures. These interaction variables are tested using the same event history model.
For the performance analysis, fixed-effects model, with first-order autocorrelation correction model is employed as a conservative test of the hypotheses (Haveman 1992) . As a robustness check, a randomeffects model is applied (Haveman 1992; Kennedy 2003; Wooldrige 2003) and a Hausman test (1978) did not reject the null hypothesis that the extra conditions imposed by a random-effects model are valid. The performance test employs a mediation logic (or more accurately reverse-mediation model), consistent with Baron and Kenny (1986) by first testing the effect of change on performance and then as a separate test validating that the effect of change on performance holds in the presence of the variables that predicted that change. Therefore, for this analysis, the primary independent variable is the sum of technical changes, lagged on the change event for two years. We chose to use annual lags over quarterly lags to examine performance effects over a longer time period and because we found no performance effects in the year of change, suggesting that a quarterly analysis was unnecessary to clarify potential causality. The controls include both the control variables from the analysis on change as well as the independent variables from the analysis on change. Finally, in addition the model was tested with controls for age, prior rounds of funding, development stage, alliances and technology category. None of these controls significantly altered the effect of change on performance and so they were dropped in favor of a parsimonious model that more closely followed the mediation logic. Table 4 summarizes the results of the Cox event history analysis of interaction effects between the CEO and top management team expertise. Results of the event analysis are reported as a coefficient of risk (specifically the log hazard ratio), therefore a hypothesis predicting a higher likelihood of change would be confirmed by a positive coefficient which implies an increase (positive effect) on risk of change whereas a negative coefficient would suggest a decrease in the risk, or likelihood, of change.
Results
Major Technology Changes
Hypothesis 1a argued that according to a knowledge-based view, a CEO with deep industry expertise increases the likelihood of change. By contrast, hypothesis 1b argued that according to a cognitive flexibility view, a non-expert CEO would be more cognitively flexible increasing the likelihood of change (and by implication an expert CEO would be less cognitively flexible, decreasing the likelihood of change). The coefficient for expert CEOs with science backgrounds is in fact negative and statistically significant (p<.01) and the coefficient for expert CEOs with a business backgrounds is very negative but due to limited cases in the sample does not have a p-value estimated 2 . Therefore H1a is disconfirmed. By contrast, the coefficient for non-expert CEOs with a business background is positive and significant (p<.01) and the coefficient for nonexpert CEOs with a science background is positive but not significant providing partial support for H1b.
Overall, the confirmation of hypothesis 1b (cognitive flexibility) and the disconfirmation of hypothesis 1a (knowledge-based view) provide strong evidence that, at the individual level of the CEO, a cognitiveflexibility perspective better predicts the likelihood of technology change than a knowledge-based prediction.
Similarly, Hypothesis 2a predicted that according to a knowledge-based view, the knowledge of a TMT with deep industry expertise would increase the likelihood of change. However, once again the coefficient for expert TMTs with science backgrounds is negative and statistically significant (p<.01) and the coefficient for expert TMTs with a business backgrounds is negative and near significance which provides some disconfirmation of hypothesis 2a. In contrast, hypothesis 2b argued that the cognitive flexibility of nonexperts in the top management team would increase the likelihood of change. The coefficient for non-expert TMTs with a business background is positive and significant (p<.01) and the coefficient for non-expert TMTs with a science background is positive and significant (p<.04). Again, the confirmation of hypothesis 2b (cognitive flexibility) and the counter-confirmation of hypothesis 2a (knowledge-based view) provide strong evidence that cognitive flexibility plays a much more significant role in predicting technology change.
Finally, hypothesis 3a predicted that knowledge complementarity would increase the ability of the firm to change. In contrast, hypothesis 3b predicted that only cognitively flexible team structures would benefit from knowledge complementarity (see figure 1 for a summary of predictions) . Due to the number of possible interactions, only statistically significant interactions for major changes were reported. Interestingly, the coefficient for a cognitively flexible team (non-expert science-based CEO) is positive and significant for the interactions with a TMT from within the industry in either business (p<.01) or science (p<.01) providing support for hypothesis 3b (cognitive flexibility). What makes this result interesting is that the interaction reverses the previously negatively effect of an expert TMT on change. The results for a non-expert business CEO and expert TMT are similarly positive but not statistically significant. In contrast, the results a more cognitively rigid, but complementary team (expert CEO leading a non-expert TMT) are highly negative supporting hypothesis 3b (cognitive flexibility). These results are the opposite of a knowledgecomplementarity perspective that suggested complementary knowledge would increase the likelihood of change. Finally, while a knowledge complementarity view predicts no benefit from matching similar types of expertise (experts with experts or non-experts with non-experts), a cognitive flexibility perspective predicts a positive effect for flexible teams and a negative effect for rigid teams. The coefficients for flexible teams (non-expert CEO with non-expert TMT) are positive and significant (p<.05) for two combinations of nonexpert teams. Similarly, the coefficient for more rigid teams (expert CEO with expert TMT) are negative and directionally indicative for several combinations of expert teams. Figure 3 provides a summary of the predicted effects and results.
------Insert Figure 3 Here-------In sum, these results suggest that simple knowledge complementarity is insufficient to predict change but rather firms must have a structure that allows cognitive flexibility to access the benefits of complementarity knowledge.
Moderate Technology Changes
Hypothesis 1a argued that according to a knowledge-based view, a CEO with deep industry expertise increases the likelihood of change. By contrast, hypothesis 1b argued that according to a cognitive flexibility view, a non-expert CEO would be more cognitively flexible increasing the likelihood of change (and by implication an expert CEO would be less cognitively flexible, decreasing the likelihood of change). The coefficient for expert CEOs with science backgrounds is negative and significant (p<.01) and the coefficient for expert CEOs with a business backgrounds is very negative but not significant. Therefore H1a is partially disconfirmed. By contrast, the coefficient for non-expert CEOs with a business background is positive and significant (p<.01) and the coefficient for non-expert CEOs with a science background is positive but not significant providing partial support for H1b. Overall, the confirmation of hypothesis 1b (cognitive flexibility) and the disconfirmation of hypothesis 1a (knowledge-based view) provide strong evidence that, at the individual level of the CEO, a cognitive-flexibility perspective better predicts the likelihood of technology change than a knowledge-based prediction.
Similarly, Hypothesis 2a predicted that according to a knowledge-based view, the knowledge of a TMT with deep industry expertise would increase the likelihood of change. However, once again the coefficient for expert TMTs with science backgrounds is negative and statistically significant (p<.01) and the coefficient for expert TMTs with a business backgrounds is negative and significant (p<.08) which disconfirms hypothesis 2a. In contrast, hypothesis 2b argued that the cognitive flexibility of non-experts in the top management team would increase the likelihood of change. The coefficient for non-expert TMTs with a business background is positive and significant (p<.01) and the coefficient for non-expert TMTs with a science background is positive and significant (p<.04). Again, the confirmation of hypothesis 2b (cognitive flexibility) and the counter-confirmation of hypothesis 2a (knowledge-based view) provide strong evidence that cognitive flexibility plays a much more significant role in predicting technology change.
Minor Technology Changes
Interestingly for minor, or incremental changes, none of the hypotheses (1a/b or 2a/b) are supported. The non-significance across the results are important in and of themselves because a qualitative observation of the firms that make incremental changes suggest that all firms make incremental changes. In other words, incremental changes are relatively easy and non-challenging for firms and so cognitive flexibility is not necessary to make incremental adjustments. Table 5 summarizes the results for the effects of technology change on performance. Models 1 and 2are a random-effects and fixed-effects test of the effects of change on performance, Model 3 adds the CEO level variables that predicted change to the base fixed effects model and Model 4 adds the TMT level variables that predicted change to the fixed effects model. Models 1 and 2 suggest that major change has a negligible effect on performance in the year of change but a positive effect the year after a change (p<.02 in model 1 and p<.01 in model 2) as well as a positive but non-significant effect two years after a change.
Performance Effects
Furthermore the effect holds in the presence of the variables that predicted the change. This suggests that making major changes can have a positive effect on performance. A qualitative assessment also supports this observation: many of the ventures that successfully reached commercial stage production made major changes along the way.
Interestingly, for moderate changes there is also a positive and significant effect, although of smaller scale than for major changes, the year after change (p<.06 in model 1 and p<.01 in model 2) that persists in the presence of the variables predicting change. There also appears to be a performance boost two years after change that is positive and significant in model 2 (p<.08) and largely persists throughout the mediation models. In contrast, for minor changes, although the coefficient is positive the evidence is weak that making incremental changes increases performance. As suggested by the analysis of change, many firms are able to make incremental changes therefore it is not a factor predicting performance.
Discussion
Knowledge and expertise can be critical assets and provide advantages to many firms, particularly those operating in stable, known environments. However, in dynamic markets such as technology industries or for certain types of firms such as new ventures, knowledge, particularly deep knowledge in the form of expertise also has its dangers since it can create cognitive rigidities. In this paper, we contrasted the predictions of a knowledge-based view against an emerging perspective on cognitive flexibility. Although a knowledge-based perspective suggests that deep knowledge would be valuable to operation and adaptation, we found that deep expertise at the CEO or management team level actually decreases the ability of the firm to adapt for significant technology changes. In contrast, we found that cognitive flexibility at the CEO and top management team level, characterized as non-expert individuals coming from outside the focal industry, actually increases the likelihood of making technology changes, supporting the view that cognitive flexibility is critical for new ventures.
Nonetheless we argued that firms need knowledge and perhaps complimentary knowledge, as suggested by a knowledge-based view, would increase firm adaptability. In contrast, although a cognitive flexibility perspective allows for the value of complimentary knowledge, this view predicts that cognitive flexibility is necessary to benefit from complimentary knowledge. Given the centrality of the CEO to a new venture, we argued that a cognitively flexible CEO (non-expert) leading a team of experts may allow the firm to access the benefits of knowledge complementarity whereas an expert CEO leading a team of non-experts would be less flexible. Interestingly, we found that a cognitively flexible team structure can reverse the effects of cognitive rigidity, whereas a complementary team with the wrong structure actually increases the effects of cognitive rigidity for major changes. These results strongly support the importance of cognitive flexibility for new ventures and firms in dynamic or technology industries.
Of interest, we also examined the effects of expertise on multiple degrees of change. Although many types, or degrees of change are acknowledge by the literature, rarely are multiple degrees of change examined in the same setting. In this paper, we examined three types of change identified by Henderson and Clark (1990): architectural (major), component (moderate) , and incremental (minor). We found that cognitively flexibility was crucial to making major changes and moderate changes but unimportant to making minor changes. We argue that minor changes are easy for all firms to make and are unaffected as much by cognitive rigidity. Interestingly when examining the interaction effects between non-expert CEOs and expert teams, we found that for major changes, a non-expert CEO could lead a normally cognitively rigid team to be more flexible. However, for more moderate (component) changes, when non-expert CEOs were paired with experts of the same type (either science or business background), the likelihood of change actually decreased.
We hypothesize that the reason for this different outcome is that when firms face major changes, the radical character of the architectural change creates a cognitive recognition that the firm is in unfamiliar territory that allows non-expert CEOs to lead change whereas for less significant changes, experts believe they are in familiar territory that lack of recognition combined with potential conflict decreases the likelihood of change.
Finally, we demonstrated that, in dynamic environments, making changes can increase performance.
In technology settings, many firms face internal development challenges and external markets that are rapidly evolving. We found that firms making major and moderate changes experienced an increase in performance shortly after making such changes (one year on average). However, firms making incremental changes experienced little change in performance because such changes are common place among all types of firms.
These results contribute to several research streams, particularly to the emerging perspective on cognitive flexibility. Although much of the literature on technology and change has highlighted the role of cognitive rigidity as an impediment to change (Henderson and Clark 1990; Barr, Stimpert et al. 1992; Christensen and Bower 1996; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000; Gilbert 2005) , an emerging body of literature suggests the importance of cognition to being able to make changes (Gilbert 2006; Eggers and Kaplan 2009; Eisenhardt, Furr et al. 2010; Garg and Furr 2010) . In particular, cognitive flexibility, or the ability of organizational members to incorporate new information and change their perspective has been suggested as critical to adaptation in both small and large firms (Furr 2010) . In this paper, we contrasted a knowledgebased view against a cognitive-flexibility perspective and found significant support for cognitive flexibility both at individual level (CEO) and group level (TMT). Similarly, Beckman (2006) looked at the role of prior organizational affiliations on new venture growth.
Despite this early work, comparatively less is known about how the human capital inherent in backgrounds of top management teams and CEOs, such as the role of expertise in prior industries, affects firm outcomes (Eggers and Kaplan 2009 ). This paper contributes to this emerging literature stream by showing how the industry background of management team members, particularly their prior expertise, shapes the ability of the firm to adapt and prosper. Furthermore, this paper shows how the interaction of different team structures with their background can reshape cognitive rigidity or flexibility, which further highlights the importance of the human capital perspective in the study of strategy and entrepreneurship.
Lastly, this study contributes to research on technology change and entrepreneurship by highlighting the significant role of change in technology industries. Although change is often recognized as part of firm life in technology industries, rarely has empirical work examined the different types of change firms face in such industries, how firms make such changes, and how such changes affect performance. In particular, this paper highlights how the dynamics of cognition apply differently depending on the degree of change. For more significant changes, cognitive flexibility appears to be a crucial and perhaps overlooked element of the ability of technology firms to change whereas less significant changes are easily accomplished. Furthermore, although the question of whether change is good or bad is often debated, this study suggests that many technology industries face significant internal and external demands for change. Certainly there are settings where change may be harmful and some changes may be harmful, but in many technology settings, the capacity to change may be critical for performance. Indeed, these results suggest that developing capabilities for change, or dynamic capabilities may be a fundamental element of firm performance. More importantly, these results suggest that cognitive flexibility may be a key component of dynamic capability. This line of research deserves further examination.
Conclusion
In conclusion it is our hope that this paper highlights many under-emphasized dimensions of strategy and entrepreneurship. In particular, the prevalence of change in new ventures of technology industries may have been overlooked and understudied. Similarly, the role of cognitive flexibility in the ability of firms to adapt also deserves further attention. Finally, the role of cognition in dynamic capability could prove to be a very fruitful and interesting line of research. The results of this paper may also provide some practical insights about how to assemble technology management teams: although it may intuitively make sense to find experts, non-experts may be more valuable in the end, particularly for the CEO position. In any case, this research suggests that cognition and cognitive flexibility may be a critical piece of the answer to many of these questions. Figure 3: Summary of interaction analysis results 
